Alexander Pruss has suggested an interesting dialectical strategy for theists here. I’m not sure what to think of this strategy. At first, I thought the gambit would work better against an atheist interlocutor who relies on the multiverse theory as a response to the fine tuning argument. However, if the theist is right that God would actualize every creation-worthy world, then the theist might have independent reason for thinking that a multiverse exists. The theist could use a multiverse argument against the argument from evil, even if the atheist doesn’t rely on a multiverse argument against fine tuning. Nevertheless, it does seem as though the theist would have to sacrifice the fine tuning argument. However, as dovetheology points out in the comments section to Pruss’ post, the theist could still argue that a theistic multiverse is more probable than an atheistic multiverse. The fine tuning argument might still work if it’s more probable than the alternative: an atheistic multiverse. Anyways, it’s a very interesting dialectical move for the theist. I’m not sure exactly how an atheist should counter. I suppose one would have to question Pruss’ assumption that the argument from evil is no stronger than the fine tuning argument. The atheist could show that the probability of evil on theism is lower than the probability of fine tuning on atheism. I don’t think that’s implausible, but it would take a lot of work.